First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Perry NO and Others 2001 (3) SA 960 (SCA)

First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Perry NO and Others 2001 (3) SA 960 (SCA)

Issue:Whether a bank that mistakenly credits a customer's account with money that does not belong to them is entitled to recover the money from the customer.

Facts:

First National Bank of South Africa Ltd (FNB) was a commercial bank in South Africa. In 1999, FNB mistakenly credited the account of a company called Perry NO with R5 million that did not belong to the company.

The money had been transferred to Perry NO's account by mistake by another bank, Nedbank. Nedbank had intended to transfer the money to the account of another company, but had mistakenly entered Perry NO's account number into the transfer instruction.

When Nedbank realized its mistake, it demanded that FNB reverse the transfer and return the R5 million to Nedbank. FNB refused to do so, arguing that it was entitled to the money because it had been credited to Perry NO's account in good faith.

Perry NO also refused to return the money, arguing that it was entitled to keep the money because it had not been enriched by the mistake. The company claimed that it had already spent the money on legitimate business expenses.

Held:

The Court held that FNB was entitled to recover the R5 million from Perry NO. The Court reasoned that Perry NO had been unjustly enriched by the mistake and that FNB was therefore entitled to recover the money.

The court also found that Perry NO had not changed its position in reliance on the mistaken transfer of the money.

Key Facts:

• A bank mistakenly credited a customer's account with money that did not belong to them.
• The bank demanded that the customer return the money, but the customer refused.
• The bank sued the customer to recover the money.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the bank was entitled to recover the money from the customer.
• The Court reasoned that the customer had been unjustly enriched by the mistake and that the bank was therefore entitled to recover the money.
• The court also found that the customer had not changed its position in reliance on the mistaken transfer of the money.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Perry NO and Others 2001 (3) SA 960 (SCA) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the rights of banks that mistakenly credit a customer's account with money that does not belong to them.

Minister van Justisie v Van Heerden 1961 (3) SA 25 (O)

Minister van Justisie v Van Heerden 1961 (3) SA 25 (O)

Issue:Whether a police officer who arrests a person without a warrant is liable for damages if the arrest is found to be unlawful.

Facts:

Van Heerden was arrested by a police officer without a warrant. Van Heerden was detained for several days before being released without charge. Van Heerden then sued the Minister of Justice, claiming damages for wrongful arrest and detention.

The Minister of Justice denied that the arrest was unlawful. The Minister claimed that the police officer had acted reasonably in arresting Van Heerden without a warrant.

Held:

The Court held that the arrest was unlawful and that Van Heerden was entitled to damages. The Court reasoned that the police officer had not had reasonable grounds for suspecting Van Heerden of having committed an offence.

The court also found that the police officer had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977.

Key Facts:

• A police officer arrested a person without a warrant.
• The person was detained for several days before being released without charge.
• The person sued the Minister of Justice, claiming damages for wrongful arrest and detention.
• The Minister of Justice denied that the arrest was unlawful.
• The Minister claimed that the police officer had acted reasonably in arresting the person without a warrant.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the arrest was unlawful and that the person was entitled to damages.
• The Court reasoned that the police officer had not had reasonable grounds for suspecting the person of having committed an offence.
• The court also found that the police officer had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Minister van Justisie v Van Heerden 1961 (3) SA 25 (O) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the powers of police officers to arrest without a warrant.

Van Zyl v Credit Corporation of SA Ltd 1960 (4) SA 582 (A)

 Van Zyl v Credit Corporation of SA Ltd 1960 (4) SA 582 (A)

Issue:Whether a surety can claim against a cedent for damages arising from the cedent's failure to disclose material facts about the debt at the time of cession.

Facts:

Credit Corporation of SA Ltd (Credit Corporation) was a credit company that provided credit to businesses. In 1959, Credit Corporation granted a loan of R25,000 to Van Zyl, a businessman. Van Zyl's business partner, Van Zyl, signed a surety agreement guaranteeing the repayment of the loan.

In 1960, Van Zyl's business failed, and he was unable to repay the loan. Credit Corporation then ceded the debt to a third party, who demanded payment from Van Zyl, the surety. Van Zyl refused to pay, arguing that Credit Corporation had failed to disclose material facts about the debt at the time of cession.

Van Zyl claimed that Credit Corporation had failed to disclose the following material facts:

• That Van Zyl's business was in financial difficulty at the time of the loan.
• That Van Zyl had been unable to repay previous loans.
• That Credit Corporation had granted the loan to Van Zyl's business on the understanding that Van Zyl would provide personal guarantees.

Credit Corporation denied that it had failed to disclose any material facts about the debt. The company claimed that it had disclosed all material facts to Van Zyl, the surety, and that Van Zyl was therefore not entitled to claim damages.

Held:

The Court held that Van Zyl, the surety, was not entitled to claim damages from Credit Corporation, the cedent. The Court reasoned that Van Zyl had not suffered any loss as a result of Credit Corporation's failure to disclose material facts about the debt.

The court also found that Van Zyl had not been induced to sign the surety agreement by Credit Corporation's failure to disclose material facts.

Key Facts:

• A surety signed a surety agreement guaranteeing the repayment of a loan.
• The creditor ceded the debt to a third party.
• The surety refused to pay, arguing that the creditor had failed to disclose material facts about the debt at the time of cession.
• The surety claimed that the creditor had failed to disclose the following material facts:
  • That the debtor's business was in financial difficulty at the time of the loan.
  • That the debtor had been unable to repay previous loans.
  • That the creditor had granted the loan to the debtor on the understanding that the surety would provide personal guarantees.
• The creditor denied that it had failed to disclose any material facts about the debt.
• The company claimed that it had disclosed all material facts to the surety, and that the surety was therefore not entitled to claim damages.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the surety was not entitled to claim damages from the creditor.
• The Court reasoned that the surety had not suffered any loss as a result of the creditor's failure to disclose material facts about the debt.
• The court also found that the surety had not been induced to sign the surety agreement by the creditor's failure to disclose material facts.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Van Zyl v Credit Corporation of SA Ltd 1960 (4) SA 582 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the rights of sureties when a debt is ceded.

Saambou Bank Ltd v Essa 1993 (4) SA 62 (N)

Saambou Bank Ltd v Essa 1993 (4) SA 62 (N)

Issue:Whether a bank that mistakenly pays a cheque after the drawer has countermanded payment can recover the amount paid from the payee.

Facts:

Saambou Bank Ltd (Saambou Bank) was a commercial bank in South Africa. In 1992, Essa, a customer of Saambou Bank, drew a cheque for R20,000 in favor of a third party. The cheque was stolen from Essa's office and presented for payment at a Saambou Bank branch.

Despite the fact that Essa had countermanded payment on the cheque before it was presented for payment, Saambou Bank mistakenly paid the cheque into the account of the person who presented it. Essa then demanded that Saambou Bank repay the amount of the cheque.

Saambou Bank refused to repay the amount, arguing that it was not liable for the consequences of its mistake. The bank claimed that it had paid the cheque in good faith and that it was not aware that the cheque had been stolen or that payment had been countermanded.

Held:

The Court held that Saambou Bank was entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from Essa. The Court reasoned that Essa had been unjustly enriched as a result of the payment of the cheque.

The court also found that Essa had not changed its position in reliance on the payment of the cheque.

Key Facts:

• A bank mistakenly paid out a cheque after the drawer had countermanded payment.
• The drawer demanded that the bank repay the amount of the cheque.
• The bank refused to repay the amount, arguing that it was not liable for the consequences of its mistake.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the bank was entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from the drawer.
• The Court reasoned that the drawer had been unjustly enriched as a result of the payment of the cheque.
• The court also found that the drawer had not changed its position in reliance on the payment of the cheque.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Saambou Bank Ltd v Essa 1993 (4) SA 62 (N) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the rights of banks that mistakenly pay out cheques after the drawer has countermanded payment.

MCC Bazaar v Harris & Jones (Pty) Ltd 1954 (3) SA 158 (T)

MCC Bazaar v Harris & Jones (Pty) Ltd 1954 (3) SA 158 (T)

Issue: Whether a buyer can recover money paid for goods purchased under a contract that is invalid due to non-compliance with statutory requirements.

Facts:

MCC Bazaar (MCC) purchased a cash register from Harris & Jones (Pty) Ltd (H&J) under a hire-purchase agreement. The agreement was signed by MCC's agent, but not by MCC itself, as required by Section 4(1) of the Hire-Purchase Act, No. 36 of 1942.

MCC paid the full purchase price for the cash register but later claimed that the contract was invalid due to non-compliance with Section 4(1) of the Hire-Purchase Act and demanded a refund of the money paid.

H&J refused to refund the money, arguing that MCC had received the cash register and had therefore benefited from the contract.

Held:

The Court held that MCC was not entitled to a refund of the money paid. The Court reasoned that MCC had received the cash register and had therefore benefited from the contract, even though the contract was invalid.

The court also found that MCC had not suffered any loss as a result of the invalid contract.

Key Facts:

• A purchaser of a cash register under a hire-purchase agreement paid the full purchase price.
• The hire-purchase agreement was invalid due to non-compliance with a statutory requirement.
• The purchaser demanded a refund of the money paid.
• The seller refused to refund the money, arguing that the purchaser had received the cash register and had therefore benefited from the contract.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the purchaser was not entitled to a refund of the money paid.
• The Court reasoned that the purchaser had received the cash register and had therefore benefited from the contract, even though the contract was invalid.
• The court also found that the purchaser had not suffered any loss as a result of the invalid contract.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in MCC Bazaar v Harris & Jones (Pty) Ltd 1954 (3) SA 158 (T) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the rights of purchasers of goods under invalid contracts.

Lottering v SA Motor Acceptance Corporation Ltd 1962 (4) SA 1 (E)

Lottering v SA Motor Acceptance Corporation Ltd 1962 (4) SA 1 (E)

Issue: Whether a motor finance company can recover a vehicle from a purchaser who has failed to make payments under a hire-purchase agreement.

Facts:

Lottering purchased a vehicle from SA Motor Acceptance Corporation Ltd (SAMAC) under a hire-purchase agreement. The agreement provided that Lottering would make monthly payments to SAMAC until the full purchase price of the vehicle was paid.

Lottering fell into arrears with his payments and SAMAC repossessed the vehicle. Lottering then demanded that SAMAC return the vehicle to him, arguing that the repossession was unlawful.

SAMAC refused to return the vehicle, arguing that it was entitled to repossess the vehicle under the terms of the hire-purchase agreement.

Held:

The Court held that SAMAC was not entitled to repossess the vehicle. The Court reasoned that the hire-purchase agreement did not expressly give SAMAC the right to repossess the vehicle if Lottering fell into arrears with his payments.

The court also found that SAMAC had not given Lottering a reasonable opportunity to rectify his breach of contract by paying the arrears in his payments.

Key Facts:

• A purchaser of a vehicle under a hire-purchase agreement failed to make payments.
• The motor finance company repossessed the vehicle.
• The purchaser demanded that the vehicle be returned to him, arguing that the repossession was unlawful.
• The motor finance company refused to return the vehicle, arguing that it was entitled to repossess the vehicle under the terms of the hire-purchase agreement.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the motor finance company was not entitled to repossess the vehicle.
• The Court reasoned that the hire-purchase agreement did not expressly give the motor finance company the right to repossess the vehicle if the purchaser fell into arrears with his payments.
• The court also found that the motor finance company had not given the purchaser a reasonable opportunity to rectify his breach of contract by paying the arrears in his payments.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Lottering v SA Motor Acceptance Corporation Ltd 1962 (4) SA 1 (E) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the rights of motor finance companies to repossess vehicles from purchasers who have failed to make payments under hire-purchase agreements.

John Bell and Co Ltd v Esselen 1954 (1) SA 147 (A)

 John Bell and Co Ltd v Esselen 1954 (1) SA 147 (A)

Issue: Whether a company is liable for a cheque drawn by its secretary and manager without the company's knowledge, where the proceeds of the cheque are paid to a third party who is not aware of the fraud.

Facts:

John Bell and Co Ltd (John Bell) was a company that carried on business in South Africa. In 1952, the company's secretary and manager, Esselen, drew a cheque for R4,000 in favor of himself without the company's knowledge or authorization. The cheque was presented for payment at a bank and was duly honored.

John Bell later discovered that the cheque had been drawn by Esselen without authorization and demanded that the bank repay the amount of the cheque. The bank refused to repay the amount, arguing that it had acted in good faith and that it was not aware that the cheque had been drawn fraudulently.

Held:

The Court held that John Bell was not entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from the bank. The Court reasoned that Esselen had had the authority to draw cheques on behalf of the company and that the bank had acted in good faith in paying the cheque.

The court also found that the proceeds of the cheque had been paid to a third party who was not aware of the fraud and that John Bell had therefore not suffered any loss as a result of the fraud.

Key Facts:

• A company's secretary and manager drew a cheque without the company's knowledge or authorization.
• The cheque was presented for payment at a bank and was duly honored.
• The company demanded that the bank repay the amount of the cheque.
• The bank refused to repay the amount, arguing that it had acted in good faith and that it was not aware that the cheque had been drawn fraudulently.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the company was not entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from the bank.
• The Court reasoned that the secretary and manager had had the authority to draw cheques on behalf of the company and that the bank had acted in good faith in paying the cheque.
• The court also found that the proceeds of the cheque had been paid to a third party who was not aware of the fraud and that the company had therefore not suffered any loss as a result of the fraud.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in John Bell and Co Ltd v Esselen 1954 (1) SA 147 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the liability of companies for cheques drawn by their employees.

Govender v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1984 (4) SA 392 (C)

Govender v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1984 (4) SA 392 (C)

Issue: Whether a bank that mistakenly pays out a cheque after the drawer has countermanded payment can recover the amount paid from the payee.

Facts:

In 1983, Govender, a customer of Standard Bank of SA Ltd (Standard Bank), drew a cheque for R2,000 in favor of a third party. The cheque was stolen from Govender's office and presented for payment at a Standard Bank branch.

Despite the fact that Govender had countermanded payment on the cheque before it was presented for payment, Standard Bank mistakenly paid the cheque into the account of the person who presented it. Govender then demanded that Standard Bank repay the amount of the cheque.

Standard Bank refused to repay the amount, arguing that it was not liable for the consequences of its mistake. The bank claimed that it had paid the cheque in good faith and that it was not aware that the cheque had been stolen or that payment had been countermanded.

Held:

The Court held that Standard Bank was not entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from Govender. The Court reasoned that Standard Bank had been negligent in failing to verify the identity of the person who presented the cheque for payment and that it had therefore not acted in good faith.

The court also found that Govender had not been unjustly enriched as a result of the payment of the cheque. The court reasoned that Govender had not received any benefit from the payment and that the money had been paid to the wrong person.

Key Facts:

• A bank mistakenly paid out a cheque after the drawer had countermanded payment.
• The drawer demanded that the bank repay the amount of the cheque.
• The bank refused to repay the amount, arguing that it was not liable for the consequences of its mistake.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the bank was not entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from the drawer.
• The Court reasoned that the bank had been negligent in failing to verify the identity of the person who presented the cheque for payment and that it had therefore not acted in good faith.
• The court also found that the drawer had not been unjustly enriched as a result of the payment of the cheque.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Govender v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1984 (4) SA 392 (C) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the rights of banks that mistakenly pay out cheques after the drawer has countermanded payment.

CIR v First National Industrial Bank Ltd 1990 3 SA 641 (A)

CIR v First National Industrial Bank Ltd 1990 3 SA 641 (A)

Issue: Whether a bank is liable to repay a customer for money paid under a mistake of law.

Facts:

First National Industrial Bank Ltd (FNB) was a commercial bank in South Africa. In 1987, the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (CIR) issued a ruling that banks were liable to pay stamp duty on certain transactions involving their customers' autocard machines.

FNB objected to the CIR's ruling, arguing that it was incorrect and that banks were not liable to pay stamp duty on those transactions. However, FNB paid the stamp duty under protest, fearing that if it did not, the CIR would impose penalties.

In 1989, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the CIR's ruling was incorrect and that banks were not liable to pay stamp duty on the transactions in question. FNB then demanded that the CIR repay the stamp duty it had paid under protest.

The CIR refused to repay the stamp duty, arguing that FNB had not been under a mistake of law when it paid the stamp duty. The CIR claimed that FNB had been aware of the CIR's ruling and that it had paid the stamp duty simply to avoid penalties.

Held:

The Court held that FNB was entitled to a refund of the stamp duty it had paid under protest. The Court reasoned that FNB had been under a mistake of law when it paid the stamp duty. The court also found that the CIR had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the stamp duty.

Key Facts:

• A bank paid stamp duty under protest, believing it was legally obligated to do so.
• The bank later learned that it was not legally obligated to pay the stamp duty and demanded a refund.
• The tax authority refused to refund the stamp duty, arguing that the bank had not been under a mistake of law.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the bank was entitled to a refund of the stamp duty.
• The Court reasoned that the bank had been under a mistake of law when it paid the stamp duty.
• The court also found that the tax authority had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the stamp duty.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in CIR v First National Industrial Bank Ltd 1990 3 SA 641 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the rights of parties who make payments under a mistake of law.

CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd v Novick 1979 (2) SA 546 (C)

CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd v Novick 1979 (2) SA 546 (C)

Issue: Whether a party can recover payments made under duress.

Facts:

CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd (CD Development) was a company that supplied water to Novick, a property owner. In 1966, CD Development increased the water tariff, claiming that it was necessary to cover rising costs. Novick objected to the increase, arguing that it was unreasonable and that CD Development had not provided sufficient justification for the increase.

Despite its objections, Novick continued to pay the increased tariff under protest, fearing that if it did not, CD Development would cut off its water supply.

In 1969, Novick sued CD Development for a refund of the money it had paid under protest, arguing that it had been forced to make the payments under duress.

CD Development argued that Novick was not entitled to a refund because it had not been under duress. They claimed that Novick had always had the option to challenge the tariff increase in court and that it had not been forced to pay the increased tariff simply because it was afraid of having its water supply cut off.

Held:

The Court held that Novick was entitled to a refund of the money it had paid under protest. The Court reasoned that Novick had been under duress when it paid the increased tariff. The court also found that CD Development had been aware of Novick's objections to the tariff increase and that it had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the money.

Key Facts:

• A property owner paid increased water tariffs under protest.
• The property owner sued the water supplier for a refund of the money it had paid under protest, arguing that it had been forced to make the payments under duress.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the property owner was entitled to a refund of the money it had paid under protest.
• The Court reasoned that the property owner had been under duress when it paid the increased tariff.
• The court also found that the water supplier had been aware of the property owner's objections to the tariff increase and that it had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the money.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd v Novick 1979 (2) SA 546 (C) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision made it clear that a party can recover payments made under duress.

B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 (2) SA 279 (A)

 B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 (2) SA 279 (A)

Issue: Whether a bank that mistakenly pays a cheque after the drawer has countermanded payment can recover the amount paid from the payee.

Facts:

B & H Engineering (B & H) was a company that supplied goods to Sapco (Pty) Ltd (Sapco). In 1993, Sapco drew a cheque for R16,048 in favor of B & H on the First National Bank of SA Ltd (FNB). The cheque was delivered to B & H and accepted by the company in payment of the contract price for the goods supplied.

Sapco subsequently countermanded the payment of the cheque, but FNB mistakenly paid the cheque into B & H's account. FNB then demanded that B & H repay the amount of the cheque. B & H refused to repay the amount, arguing that it was entitled to the money.

Held:

The Court held that FNB was entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from B & H. The Court reasoned that FNB had made a mistake in paying the cheque and that B & H had been unjustly enriched as a result of the mistake.

The Court also found that B & H had not changed its position in reliance on the payment of the cheque and that it was therefore not unfair to require B & H to repay the amount of the cheque.

Key Facts:

• A bank mistakenly paid a cheque after the drawer had countermanded payment.
• The bank demanded that the payee repay the amount of the cheque.
• The payee refused to repay the amount, arguing that it was entitled to the money.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the bank was entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from the payee.
• The Court reasoned that the bank had made a mistake in paying the cheque and that the payee had been unjustly enriched as a result of the mistake.
• The Court also found that the payee had not changed its position in reliance on the payment of the cheque and that it was therefore not unfair to require the payee to repay the amount of the cheque.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 (2) SA 279 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the rights of banks that mistakenly pay cheques after the drawer has countermanded payment.

Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers of SA v Die 1963–Ambagsaalvereniging (1) 1967 (1) SA 586 (T)

Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers of SA v Die 1963–Ambagsaalvereniging (1) 1967 (1) SA 586 (T)

Issue: Whether a trade union, in terms of its constitution, can make donations to political parties.

Facts:

The Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers of SA (ASW) was a registered trade union in South Africa. The ASW's constitution allowed for the payment of donations to "any other society or institution whose objects in the opinion of the executive committee are calculated to benefit the trade union movement generally."

In 1963, the ASW's executive committee donated R16,218 to Die 1963-Ambagsaalvereniging (Die Ambagsaalvereniging), a political party that was formed to support the National Party government.

A group of ASW members challenged the ASW's donation to Die Ambagsaalvereniging, arguing that the donation was ultra vires (beyond the legal powers) of the ASW.

Held:

The Court held that the ASW's donation to Die Ambagsaalvereniging was ultra vires and invalid. The Court reasoned that the ASW's constitution did not authorize the ASW to make donations to political parties.

The Court also found that the ASW's donation to Die Ambagsaalvereniging was not calculated to benefit the trade union movement generally.

Key Facts:

• A trade union made a donation to a political party.
• A group of trade union members challenged the donation, arguing that it was ultra vires.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the trade union's donation to the political party was ultra vires and invalid.
• The Court reasoned that the trade union's constitution did not authorize the trade union to make donations to political parties.
• The Court also found that the trade union's donation to the political party was not calculated to benefit the trade union movement generally.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers of SA v Die 1963–Ambagsaalvereniging (1) 1967 (1) SA 586 (T) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the powers of trade unions to make donations.

Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Willers 1994 (3) SA 283 (A)

Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Willers 1994 (3) SA 283 (A)

Issue: Whether a company's directors can be held personally liable for the company's unpaid income tax.

Facts:

In 1985, a company named Bergbries (Edms) Bpk (Bergbries) was placed in liquidation. At the time of its liquidation, Bergbries owed an amount of R3,264,234 in unpaid income tax to the South African Revenue Service (SARS).

SARS sought to recover the unpaid income tax from the directors of Bergbries. SARS argued that the directors of Bergbries had been negligent in failing to ensure that Bergbries paid its taxes.

The directors of Bergbries denied liability, arguing that they were not personally liable for the company's debts.

Held:

The Court held that the directors of Bergbries were not personally liable for the company's unpaid income tax. The Court reasoned that the directors of Bergbries had not acted negligently in failing to ensure that Bergbries paid its taxes.

The Court also found that SARS had not taken adequate steps to collect the unpaid income tax from Bergbries before seeking to recover it from the directors.

Key Facts:

• A company was placed in liquidation with unpaid income tax.
• The South African Revenue Service (SARS) sought to recover the unpaid income tax from the company's directors.
• The directors of the company denied liability, arguing that they were not personally liable for the company's debts.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the directors of the company were not personally liable for the company's unpaid income tax.
• The Court reasoned that the directors of the company had not acted negligently in failing to ensure that the company paid its taxes.
• The Court also found that SARS had not taken adequate steps to collect the unpaid income tax from the company before seeking to recover it from the directors.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Willers 1994 (3) SA 283 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the personal liability of directors for the debts of their companies.

Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NO v Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 2 SA 35 (A)

Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NO v Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 2 SA 35 (A)

Issue: Whether the true owner of a stolen bank draft could recover its proceeds from an intermediate possessor of the draft who had innocently cashed it.

Facts:

In 1995, a bank draft in the amount of R150,000 was issued in favor of a company named Lombo. The bank draft was stolen from Lombo's offices.

The stolen bank draft was subsequently cashed at a branch of Fidelity Bank. The cashier at Fidelity Bank did not recognize the person who presented the bank draft for cashing and asked for identification. The person presented a false driver's license and a copy of Lombo's certificate of incorporation. The cashier then cashed the bank draft and paid the proceeds to the person who presented it.

Lombo later discovered that its bank draft had been stolen and that the proceeds had been cashed at Fidelity Bank. Lombo demanded that Fidelity Bank repay the proceeds of the bank draft. Fidelity Bank refused, arguing that it was not liable for the actions of the person who cashed the bank draft.

Held:

The Court held that Fidelity Bank was not liable to Lombo for the proceeds of the stolen bank draft. The Court reasoned that Fidelity Bank had acted innocently in cashing the bank draft and that it was not liable for the loss suffered by Lombo.

The Court also found that Lombo had been negligent in failing to take adequate steps to protect its bank draft from theft.

Key Facts:

• A bank draft was stolen from a company's offices.
• The stolen bank draft was cashed at a bank.
• The bank did not recognize the person who presented the bank draft for cashing and asked for identification.
• The person presented a false driver's license and a copy of the company's certificate of incorporation.
• The bank cashed the bank draft and paid the proceeds to the person who presented it.
• The company demanded that the bank repay the proceeds of the bank draft.
• The bank refused, arguing that it was not liable for the actions of the person who cashed the bank draft.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the bank was not liable to the company for the proceeds of the stolen bank draft.
• The Court reasoned that the bank had acted innocently in cashing the bank draft and that it was not liable for the loss suffered by the company.
• The Court also found that the company had been negligent in failing to take adequate steps to protect its bank draft from theft.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NO v Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 2 SA 35 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the liability of banks for the cashing of stolen bank drafts.

Rulten v Herald Industries (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 600 (D&C)

Rulten v Herald Industries (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 600 (D&C)

Issue: Whether a company can be held liable for the actions of its employees, even if the employees were acting outside the scope of their employment.

Facts:

In 1979, a company named Herald Industries (Pty) Ltd (Herald Industries) was hired to carry out renovations on a house owned by Mr. Rulten. During the renovations, an employee of Herald Industries negligently damaged a valuable painting that was owned by Mr. Rulten.

Mr. Rulten sued Herald Industries for damages. Herald Industries denied liability, arguing that the employee had been acting outside the scope of his employment when he damaged the painting.

Held:

The Court held that Herald Industries was liable for the actions of its employee. The Court reasoned that the employee had been using company property (a ladder) when he damaged the painting and that this fact was sufficient to establish a basis for liability.

The Court also found that Herald Industries had not taken adequate steps to prevent the employee from using company property in a negligent manner.

Key Facts:

• A company was hired to carry out renovations on a house.
• During the renovations, an employee of the company negligently damaged a valuable painting owned by the homeowner.
• The homeowner sued the company for damages.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the company was liable for the actions of its employee.
• The Court reasoned that the employee had been using company property (a ladder) when he damaged the painting and that this fact was sufficient to establish a basis for liability.
• The Court also found that the company had not taken adequate steps to prevent the employee from using company property in a negligent manner.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Rulten v Herald Industries (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 600 (D&C) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision expanded the scope of vicarious liability and made it clear that companies can be held liable for the actions of their employees, even if those actions were not authorized by the company.

Rayne Finance (Edms) Bpk v Queenstown Munisipaliteit 1988 (4) SA 193 (EC)

Rayne Finance (Edms) Bpk v Queenstown Munisipaliteit 1988 (4) SA 193 (EC)

Issue: Whether a municipality can recover payments made under a mistake of fact.

Facts:

Rayne Finance (Edms) Bpk (Rayne Finance) was a company that owned immovable property in Queenstown. The Queenstown Munisipaliteit (Municipality) was the local authority responsible for levying property taxes in Queenstown.

In 1986, the Municipality sent Rayne Finance a rates assessment notice that included a charge for the use of a sewage disposal system. Rayne Finance paid the rates assessment, including the charge for the use of the sewage disposal system.

However, Rayne Finance later discovered that it had not actually been connected to the sewage disposal system. As a result, Rayne Finance demanded a refund of the money it had paid for the use of the sewage disposal system.

The Municipality refused to refund the money, arguing that Rayne Finance had not made a mistake of fact. The Municipality argued that Rayne Finance had had the opportunity to inspect the rates assessment notice and to object to the charge for the use of the sewage disposal system if it believed that it was incorrect.

Held:

The Court held that Rayne Finance was entitled to a refund of the money it had paid for the use of the sewage disposal system. The Court reasoned that Rayne Finance had made a mistake of fact in believing that it was connected to the sewage disposal system.

The Court also found that the Municipality had been aware of Rayne Finance's belief that it was connected to the sewage disposal system and that it had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the money.

Key Facts:

• A company paid property taxes to a municipality, including a charge for the use of a sewage disposal system.
• The company later discovered that it had not actually been connected to the sewage disposal system.
• The company demanded a refund of the money it had paid for the use of the sewage disposal system.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the company was entitled to a refund of the money it had paid for the use of the sewage disposal system.
• The Court reasoned that the company had made a mistake of fact in believing that it was connected to the sewage disposal system.
• The Court also found that the municipality had been aware of the company's belief that it was connected to the sewage disposal system and that it had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the money.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Rayne Finance (Edms) Bpk v Queenstown Munisipaliteit 1988 (4) SA 193 (EC) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision made it clear that a municipality cannot recover payments made under a mistake of fact.