Lottering v SA Motor Acceptance Corporation Ltd 1962 (4) SA 1 (E)

Lottering v SA Motor Acceptance Corporation Ltd 1962 (4) SA 1 (E)

Issue: Whether a motor finance company can recover a vehicle from a purchaser who has failed to make payments under a hire-purchase agreement.

Facts:

Lottering purchased a vehicle from SA Motor Acceptance Corporation Ltd (SAMAC) under a hire-purchase agreement. The agreement provided that Lottering would make monthly payments to SAMAC until the full purchase price of the vehicle was paid.

Lottering fell into arrears with his payments and SAMAC repossessed the vehicle. Lottering then demanded that SAMAC return the vehicle to him, arguing that the repossession was unlawful.

SAMAC refused to return the vehicle, arguing that it was entitled to repossess the vehicle under the terms of the hire-purchase agreement.

Held:

The Court held that SAMAC was not entitled to repossess the vehicle. The Court reasoned that the hire-purchase agreement did not expressly give SAMAC the right to repossess the vehicle if Lottering fell into arrears with his payments.

The court also found that SAMAC had not given Lottering a reasonable opportunity to rectify his breach of contract by paying the arrears in his payments.

Key Facts:

• A purchaser of a vehicle under a hire-purchase agreement failed to make payments.
• The motor finance company repossessed the vehicle.
• The purchaser demanded that the vehicle be returned to him, arguing that the repossession was unlawful.
• The motor finance company refused to return the vehicle, arguing that it was entitled to repossess the vehicle under the terms of the hire-purchase agreement.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the motor finance company was not entitled to repossess the vehicle.
• The Court reasoned that the hire-purchase agreement did not expressly give the motor finance company the right to repossess the vehicle if the purchaser fell into arrears with his payments.
• The court also found that the motor finance company had not given the purchaser a reasonable opportunity to rectify his breach of contract by paying the arrears in his payments.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Lottering v SA Motor Acceptance Corporation Ltd 1962 (4) SA 1 (E) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the rights of motor finance companies to repossess vehicles from purchasers who have failed to make payments under hire-purchase agreements.

John Bell and Co Ltd v Esselen 1954 (1) SA 147 (A)

 John Bell and Co Ltd v Esselen 1954 (1) SA 147 (A)

Issue: Whether a company is liable for a cheque drawn by its secretary and manager without the company's knowledge, where the proceeds of the cheque are paid to a third party who is not aware of the fraud.

Facts:

John Bell and Co Ltd (John Bell) was a company that carried on business in South Africa. In 1952, the company's secretary and manager, Esselen, drew a cheque for R4,000 in favor of himself without the company's knowledge or authorization. The cheque was presented for payment at a bank and was duly honored.

John Bell later discovered that the cheque had been drawn by Esselen without authorization and demanded that the bank repay the amount of the cheque. The bank refused to repay the amount, arguing that it had acted in good faith and that it was not aware that the cheque had been drawn fraudulently.

Held:

The Court held that John Bell was not entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from the bank. The Court reasoned that Esselen had had the authority to draw cheques on behalf of the company and that the bank had acted in good faith in paying the cheque.

The court also found that the proceeds of the cheque had been paid to a third party who was not aware of the fraud and that John Bell had therefore not suffered any loss as a result of the fraud.

Key Facts:

• A company's secretary and manager drew a cheque without the company's knowledge or authorization.
• The cheque was presented for payment at a bank and was duly honored.
• The company demanded that the bank repay the amount of the cheque.
• The bank refused to repay the amount, arguing that it had acted in good faith and that it was not aware that the cheque had been drawn fraudulently.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the company was not entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from the bank.
• The Court reasoned that the secretary and manager had had the authority to draw cheques on behalf of the company and that the bank had acted in good faith in paying the cheque.
• The court also found that the proceeds of the cheque had been paid to a third party who was not aware of the fraud and that the company had therefore not suffered any loss as a result of the fraud.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in John Bell and Co Ltd v Esselen 1954 (1) SA 147 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the liability of companies for cheques drawn by their employees.

Govender v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1984 (4) SA 392 (C)

Govender v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1984 (4) SA 392 (C)

Issue: Whether a bank that mistakenly pays out a cheque after the drawer has countermanded payment can recover the amount paid from the payee.

Facts:

In 1983, Govender, a customer of Standard Bank of SA Ltd (Standard Bank), drew a cheque for R2,000 in favor of a third party. The cheque was stolen from Govender's office and presented for payment at a Standard Bank branch.

Despite the fact that Govender had countermanded payment on the cheque before it was presented for payment, Standard Bank mistakenly paid the cheque into the account of the person who presented it. Govender then demanded that Standard Bank repay the amount of the cheque.

Standard Bank refused to repay the amount, arguing that it was not liable for the consequences of its mistake. The bank claimed that it had paid the cheque in good faith and that it was not aware that the cheque had been stolen or that payment had been countermanded.

Held:

The Court held that Standard Bank was not entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from Govender. The Court reasoned that Standard Bank had been negligent in failing to verify the identity of the person who presented the cheque for payment and that it had therefore not acted in good faith.

The court also found that Govender had not been unjustly enriched as a result of the payment of the cheque. The court reasoned that Govender had not received any benefit from the payment and that the money had been paid to the wrong person.

Key Facts:

• A bank mistakenly paid out a cheque after the drawer had countermanded payment.
• The drawer demanded that the bank repay the amount of the cheque.
• The bank refused to repay the amount, arguing that it was not liable for the consequences of its mistake.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the bank was not entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from the drawer.
• The Court reasoned that the bank had been negligent in failing to verify the identity of the person who presented the cheque for payment and that it had therefore not acted in good faith.
• The court also found that the drawer had not been unjustly enriched as a result of the payment of the cheque.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Govender v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1984 (4) SA 392 (C) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the rights of banks that mistakenly pay out cheques after the drawer has countermanded payment.

CIR v First National Industrial Bank Ltd 1990 3 SA 641 (A)

CIR v First National Industrial Bank Ltd 1990 3 SA 641 (A)

Issue: Whether a bank is liable to repay a customer for money paid under a mistake of law.

Facts:

First National Industrial Bank Ltd (FNB) was a commercial bank in South Africa. In 1987, the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (CIR) issued a ruling that banks were liable to pay stamp duty on certain transactions involving their customers' autocard machines.

FNB objected to the CIR's ruling, arguing that it was incorrect and that banks were not liable to pay stamp duty on those transactions. However, FNB paid the stamp duty under protest, fearing that if it did not, the CIR would impose penalties.

In 1989, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the CIR's ruling was incorrect and that banks were not liable to pay stamp duty on the transactions in question. FNB then demanded that the CIR repay the stamp duty it had paid under protest.

The CIR refused to repay the stamp duty, arguing that FNB had not been under a mistake of law when it paid the stamp duty. The CIR claimed that FNB had been aware of the CIR's ruling and that it had paid the stamp duty simply to avoid penalties.

Held:

The Court held that FNB was entitled to a refund of the stamp duty it had paid under protest. The Court reasoned that FNB had been under a mistake of law when it paid the stamp duty. The court also found that the CIR had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the stamp duty.

Key Facts:

• A bank paid stamp duty under protest, believing it was legally obligated to do so.
• The bank later learned that it was not legally obligated to pay the stamp duty and demanded a refund.
• The tax authority refused to refund the stamp duty, arguing that the bank had not been under a mistake of law.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the bank was entitled to a refund of the stamp duty.
• The Court reasoned that the bank had been under a mistake of law when it paid the stamp duty.
• The court also found that the tax authority had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the stamp duty.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in CIR v First National Industrial Bank Ltd 1990 3 SA 641 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the rights of parties who make payments under a mistake of law.

CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd v Novick 1979 (2) SA 546 (C)

CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd v Novick 1979 (2) SA 546 (C)

Issue: Whether a party can recover payments made under duress.

Facts:

CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd (CD Development) was a company that supplied water to Novick, a property owner. In 1966, CD Development increased the water tariff, claiming that it was necessary to cover rising costs. Novick objected to the increase, arguing that it was unreasonable and that CD Development had not provided sufficient justification for the increase.

Despite its objections, Novick continued to pay the increased tariff under protest, fearing that if it did not, CD Development would cut off its water supply.

In 1969, Novick sued CD Development for a refund of the money it had paid under protest, arguing that it had been forced to make the payments under duress.

CD Development argued that Novick was not entitled to a refund because it had not been under duress. They claimed that Novick had always had the option to challenge the tariff increase in court and that it had not been forced to pay the increased tariff simply because it was afraid of having its water supply cut off.

Held:

The Court held that Novick was entitled to a refund of the money it had paid under protest. The Court reasoned that Novick had been under duress when it paid the increased tariff. The court also found that CD Development had been aware of Novick's objections to the tariff increase and that it had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the money.

Key Facts:

• A property owner paid increased water tariffs under protest.
• The property owner sued the water supplier for a refund of the money it had paid under protest, arguing that it had been forced to make the payments under duress.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the property owner was entitled to a refund of the money it had paid under protest.
• The Court reasoned that the property owner had been under duress when it paid the increased tariff.
• The court also found that the water supplier had been aware of the property owner's objections to the tariff increase and that it had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the money.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd v Novick 1979 (2) SA 546 (C) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision made it clear that a party can recover payments made under duress.

B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 (2) SA 279 (A)

 B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 (2) SA 279 (A)

Issue: Whether a bank that mistakenly pays a cheque after the drawer has countermanded payment can recover the amount paid from the payee.

Facts:

B & H Engineering (B & H) was a company that supplied goods to Sapco (Pty) Ltd (Sapco). In 1993, Sapco drew a cheque for R16,048 in favor of B & H on the First National Bank of SA Ltd (FNB). The cheque was delivered to B & H and accepted by the company in payment of the contract price for the goods supplied.

Sapco subsequently countermanded the payment of the cheque, but FNB mistakenly paid the cheque into B & H's account. FNB then demanded that B & H repay the amount of the cheque. B & H refused to repay the amount, arguing that it was entitled to the money.

Held:

The Court held that FNB was entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from B & H. The Court reasoned that FNB had made a mistake in paying the cheque and that B & H had been unjustly enriched as a result of the mistake.

The Court also found that B & H had not changed its position in reliance on the payment of the cheque and that it was therefore not unfair to require B & H to repay the amount of the cheque.

Key Facts:

• A bank mistakenly paid a cheque after the drawer had countermanded payment.
• The bank demanded that the payee repay the amount of the cheque.
• The payee refused to repay the amount, arguing that it was entitled to the money.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the bank was entitled to recover the amount of the cheque from the payee.
• The Court reasoned that the bank had made a mistake in paying the cheque and that the payee had been unjustly enriched as a result of the mistake.
• The Court also found that the payee had not changed its position in reliance on the payment of the cheque and that it was therefore not unfair to require the payee to repay the amount of the cheque.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 (2) SA 279 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the rights of banks that mistakenly pay cheques after the drawer has countermanded payment.

Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers of SA v Die 1963–Ambagsaalvereniging (1) 1967 (1) SA 586 (T)

Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers of SA v Die 1963–Ambagsaalvereniging (1) 1967 (1) SA 586 (T)

Issue: Whether a trade union, in terms of its constitution, can make donations to political parties.

Facts:

The Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers of SA (ASW) was a registered trade union in South Africa. The ASW's constitution allowed for the payment of donations to "any other society or institution whose objects in the opinion of the executive committee are calculated to benefit the trade union movement generally."

In 1963, the ASW's executive committee donated R16,218 to Die 1963-Ambagsaalvereniging (Die Ambagsaalvereniging), a political party that was formed to support the National Party government.

A group of ASW members challenged the ASW's donation to Die Ambagsaalvereniging, arguing that the donation was ultra vires (beyond the legal powers) of the ASW.

Held:

The Court held that the ASW's donation to Die Ambagsaalvereniging was ultra vires and invalid. The Court reasoned that the ASW's constitution did not authorize the ASW to make donations to political parties.

The Court also found that the ASW's donation to Die Ambagsaalvereniging was not calculated to benefit the trade union movement generally.

Key Facts:

• A trade union made a donation to a political party.
• A group of trade union members challenged the donation, arguing that it was ultra vires.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the trade union's donation to the political party was ultra vires and invalid.
• The Court reasoned that the trade union's constitution did not authorize the trade union to make donations to political parties.
• The Court also found that the trade union's donation to the political party was not calculated to benefit the trade union movement generally.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers of SA v Die 1963–Ambagsaalvereniging (1) 1967 (1) SA 586 (T) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the powers of trade unions to make donations.

Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Willers 1994 (3) SA 283 (A)

Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Willers 1994 (3) SA 283 (A)

Issue: Whether a company's directors can be held personally liable for the company's unpaid income tax.

Facts:

In 1985, a company named Bergbries (Edms) Bpk (Bergbries) was placed in liquidation. At the time of its liquidation, Bergbries owed an amount of R3,264,234 in unpaid income tax to the South African Revenue Service (SARS).

SARS sought to recover the unpaid income tax from the directors of Bergbries. SARS argued that the directors of Bergbries had been negligent in failing to ensure that Bergbries paid its taxes.

The directors of Bergbries denied liability, arguing that they were not personally liable for the company's debts.

Held:

The Court held that the directors of Bergbries were not personally liable for the company's unpaid income tax. The Court reasoned that the directors of Bergbries had not acted negligently in failing to ensure that Bergbries paid its taxes.

The Court also found that SARS had not taken adequate steps to collect the unpaid income tax from Bergbries before seeking to recover it from the directors.

Key Facts:

• A company was placed in liquidation with unpaid income tax.
• The South African Revenue Service (SARS) sought to recover the unpaid income tax from the company's directors.
• The directors of the company denied liability, arguing that they were not personally liable for the company's debts.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the directors of the company were not personally liable for the company's unpaid income tax.
• The Court reasoned that the directors of the company had not acted negligently in failing to ensure that the company paid its taxes.
• The Court also found that SARS had not taken adequate steps to collect the unpaid income tax from the company before seeking to recover it from the directors.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Willers 1994 (3) SA 283 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the personal liability of directors for the debts of their companies.

Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NO v Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 2 SA 35 (A)

Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NO v Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 2 SA 35 (A)

Issue: Whether the true owner of a stolen bank draft could recover its proceeds from an intermediate possessor of the draft who had innocently cashed it.

Facts:

In 1995, a bank draft in the amount of R150,000 was issued in favor of a company named Lombo. The bank draft was stolen from Lombo's offices.

The stolen bank draft was subsequently cashed at a branch of Fidelity Bank. The cashier at Fidelity Bank did not recognize the person who presented the bank draft for cashing and asked for identification. The person presented a false driver's license and a copy of Lombo's certificate of incorporation. The cashier then cashed the bank draft and paid the proceeds to the person who presented it.

Lombo later discovered that its bank draft had been stolen and that the proceeds had been cashed at Fidelity Bank. Lombo demanded that Fidelity Bank repay the proceeds of the bank draft. Fidelity Bank refused, arguing that it was not liable for the actions of the person who cashed the bank draft.

Held:

The Court held that Fidelity Bank was not liable to Lombo for the proceeds of the stolen bank draft. The Court reasoned that Fidelity Bank had acted innocently in cashing the bank draft and that it was not liable for the loss suffered by Lombo.

The Court also found that Lombo had been negligent in failing to take adequate steps to protect its bank draft from theft.

Key Facts:

• A bank draft was stolen from a company's offices.
• The stolen bank draft was cashed at a bank.
• The bank did not recognize the person who presented the bank draft for cashing and asked for identification.
• The person presented a false driver's license and a copy of the company's certificate of incorporation.
• The bank cashed the bank draft and paid the proceeds to the person who presented it.
• The company demanded that the bank repay the proceeds of the bank draft.
• The bank refused, arguing that it was not liable for the actions of the person who cashed the bank draft.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the bank was not liable to the company for the proceeds of the stolen bank draft.
• The Court reasoned that the bank had acted innocently in cashing the bank draft and that it was not liable for the loss suffered by the company.
• The Court also found that the company had been negligent in failing to take adequate steps to protect its bank draft from theft.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NO v Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 2 SA 35 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law relating to the liability of banks for the cashing of stolen bank drafts.

Rulten v Herald Industries (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 600 (D&C)

Rulten v Herald Industries (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 600 (D&C)

Issue: Whether a company can be held liable for the actions of its employees, even if the employees were acting outside the scope of their employment.

Facts:

In 1979, a company named Herald Industries (Pty) Ltd (Herald Industries) was hired to carry out renovations on a house owned by Mr. Rulten. During the renovations, an employee of Herald Industries negligently damaged a valuable painting that was owned by Mr. Rulten.

Mr. Rulten sued Herald Industries for damages. Herald Industries denied liability, arguing that the employee had been acting outside the scope of his employment when he damaged the painting.

Held:

The Court held that Herald Industries was liable for the actions of its employee. The Court reasoned that the employee had been using company property (a ladder) when he damaged the painting and that this fact was sufficient to establish a basis for liability.

The Court also found that Herald Industries had not taken adequate steps to prevent the employee from using company property in a negligent manner.

Key Facts:

• A company was hired to carry out renovations on a house.
• During the renovations, an employee of the company negligently damaged a valuable painting owned by the homeowner.
• The homeowner sued the company for damages.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the company was liable for the actions of its employee.
• The Court reasoned that the employee had been using company property (a ladder) when he damaged the painting and that this fact was sufficient to establish a basis for liability.
• The Court also found that the company had not taken adequate steps to prevent the employee from using company property in a negligent manner.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Rulten v Herald Industries (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 600 (D&C) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision expanded the scope of vicarious liability and made it clear that companies can be held liable for the actions of their employees, even if those actions were not authorized by the company.

Rayne Finance (Edms) Bpk v Queenstown Munisipaliteit 1988 (4) SA 193 (EC)

Rayne Finance (Edms) Bpk v Queenstown Munisipaliteit 1988 (4) SA 193 (EC)

Issue: Whether a municipality can recover payments made under a mistake of fact.

Facts:

Rayne Finance (Edms) Bpk (Rayne Finance) was a company that owned immovable property in Queenstown. The Queenstown Munisipaliteit (Municipality) was the local authority responsible for levying property taxes in Queenstown.

In 1986, the Municipality sent Rayne Finance a rates assessment notice that included a charge for the use of a sewage disposal system. Rayne Finance paid the rates assessment, including the charge for the use of the sewage disposal system.

However, Rayne Finance later discovered that it had not actually been connected to the sewage disposal system. As a result, Rayne Finance demanded a refund of the money it had paid for the use of the sewage disposal system.

The Municipality refused to refund the money, arguing that Rayne Finance had not made a mistake of fact. The Municipality argued that Rayne Finance had had the opportunity to inspect the rates assessment notice and to object to the charge for the use of the sewage disposal system if it believed that it was incorrect.

Held:

The Court held that Rayne Finance was entitled to a refund of the money it had paid for the use of the sewage disposal system. The Court reasoned that Rayne Finance had made a mistake of fact in believing that it was connected to the sewage disposal system.

The Court also found that the Municipality had been aware of Rayne Finance's belief that it was connected to the sewage disposal system and that it had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the money.

Key Facts:

• A company paid property taxes to a municipality, including a charge for the use of a sewage disposal system.
• The company later discovered that it had not actually been connected to the sewage disposal system.
• The company demanded a refund of the money it had paid for the use of the sewage disposal system.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the company was entitled to a refund of the money it had paid for the use of the sewage disposal system.
• The Court reasoned that the company had made a mistake of fact in believing that it was connected to the sewage disposal system.
• The Court also found that the municipality had been aware of the company's belief that it was connected to the sewage disposal system and that it had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the money.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Rayne Finance (Edms) Bpk v Queenstown Munisipaliteit 1988 (4) SA 193 (EC) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision made it clear that a municipality cannot recover payments made under a mistake of fact.

Port Elizabeth Municipality v Uitenhage Municipality 1971 (1) SA 724 (A)

Port Elizabeth Municipality v Uitenhage Municipality 1971 (1) SA 724 (A)

Issue: Whether a municipality can recover payments made under duress.

Facts:

The Port Elizabeth Municipality (Port Elizabeth) and the Uitenhage Municipality (Uitenhage) were two neighboring municipalities. Port Elizabeth supplied water to Uitenhage under a contract.

In 1966, Port Elizabeth increased the water tariff. Uitenhage objected to the increase, arguing that it was unreasonable. However, Uitenhage continued to pay the increased tariff under protest.

In 1969, Uitenhage sued Port Elizabeth for a refund of the money it had paid under protest. Port Elizabeth argued that Uitenhage was not entitled to a refund because it had not been under duress when it paid the increased tariff.

Held:

The Court held that Uitenhage was entitled to a refund of the money it had paid under protest. The Court reasoned that Uitenhage had been under duress because it had feared that Port Elizabeth would cut off its water supply if it did not pay the increased tariff.

The Court also found that Port Elizabeth had been aware of Uitenhage's protest and that it had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the money.

Key Facts:

• A municipality supplied water to a neighboring municipality under a contract.
• The supplying municipality increased the water tariff.
• The neighboring municipality objected to the increase but continued to pay the increased tariff under protest.
• The neighboring municipality sued the supplying municipality for a refund of the money it had paid under protest.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the neighboring municipality was entitled to a refund of the money it had paid under protest.
• The Court reasoned that the neighboring municipality had been under duress because it had feared that the supplying municipality would cut off its water supply if it did not pay the increased tariff.
• The Court also found that the supplying municipality had been aware of the neighboring municipality's protest and that it had not acted in good faith when it refused to refund the money.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Uitenhage Municipality 1971 (1) SA 724 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision made it clear that a municipality cannot recover payments made under duress.

Phillips v Hughes 1979 (1) SA 225 (N)

Phillips v Hughes 1979 (1) SA 225 (N)

Issue: Whether a person who has made a mistake of law is entitled to restitution of money paid under that mistake.

Facts:

Phillips and Hughes were co-owners of a company. Phillips agreed to purchase Hughes' share in the company for R100,000. However, Phillips mistakenly believed that he was only liable to pay R50,000. As a result, Phillips paid Hughes R50,000 and refused to pay the remaining R50,000.

Hughes sued Phillips for the remaining R50,000. Phillips argued that he should not be liable to pay the remaining R50,000 because he had made a mistake of law.

Held:

The Court held that Phillips was not entitled to restitution of the money he had paid. The Court reasoned that a mistake of law is not a ground for restitution unless it can be shown that the mistake was induced by the other party. In this case, there was no evidence that Hughes had induced Phillips to make the mistake.

Key Facts:

• Two individuals were co-owners of a company.
• One individual agreed to purchase the other individual's share in the company for a specific amount of money.
• The individual who agreed to purchase the share mistakenly believed that they were only liable to pay half of the agreed-upon amount.
• The individual made the initial payment and refused to pay the remaining amount.
• A lawsuit was filed to recover the remaining payment.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the individual was not entitled to recover the money they had already paid.
• The Court reasoned that a mistake of law is not a ground for restitution unless it can be shown that the mistake was induced by the other party.
• In this case, there was no evidence that the other party had induced the individual to make the mistake.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Phillips v Hughes 1979 (1) SA 225 (N) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision made it clear that a person who has made a mistake of law is generally not entitled to restitution of money paid under that mistake.

Nissan South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marnitz No (Stand 186 Aeroport (Pty) Ltd Intervening) 2005 (1) SA 441 (SCA)

 Nissan South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marnitz No (Stand 186 Aeroport (Pty) Ltd Intervening) 2005 (1) SA 441 (SCA)

Issue: Whether a company is liable for the actions of its employees, even if the employees were acting outside the scope of their employment.

Facts:

Nissan South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Nissan) was a company that manufactured and sold motor vehicles. Marnitz was an employee of Nissan who was responsible for the maintenance of Nissan's motor vehicles.

One day, Marnitz was driving a Nissan motor vehicle on company business when he negligently collided with another vehicle, causing damage to the other vehicle. The owner of the other vehicle sued Nissan for damages.

Nissan denied liability, arguing that Marnitz had been acting outside the scope of his employment when he collided with the other vehicle. Nissan argued that Marnitz had been driving the Nissan motor vehicle for his own personal use at the time of the collision.

Held:

The Court held that Nissan was liable for Marnitz's actions, even though Marnitz had been acting outside the scope of his employment. The Court reasoned that Marnitz had been using a Nissan motor vehicle at the time of the collision and that this fact was sufficient to establish a basis for liability.

The Court also found that Nissan had not taken adequate steps to prevent Marnitz from using the Nissan motor vehicle for his own personal use. The Court reasoned that Nissan had a duty of care to ensure that its employees did not use company property for their own personal use.

Key Facts:

• An employee of a company negligently collided with another vehicle while driving a company motor vehicle.
• The owner of the other vehicle sued the company for damages.
• The company denied liability, arguing that the employee had been acting outside the scope of his employment.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the company was liable for the employee's actions, even though the employee had been acting outside the scope of his employment.
• The Court reasoned that the employee had been using a company motor vehicle at the time of the collision and that this fact was sufficient to establish a basis for liability.
• The Court also found that the company had not taken adequate steps to prevent the employee from using the company motor vehicle for his own personal use.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Nissan South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marnitz No (Stand 186 Aeroport (Pty) Ltd Intervening) 2005 (1) SA 441 (SCA) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision expanded the scope of vicarious liability and made it clear that companies can be held liable for the actions of their employees, even if those actions were not authorized by the company.

Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue 1992 (4) SA 202 (A)

 Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue 1992 (4) SA 202 (A)

Issue: Whether an insurance company that has paid out a claim under an insurance policy can recover the money from the insured if the insured was not entitled to the money in the first place.

Facts:

Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd (WFE) was an insurance company that had insured a building against fire. The building was damaged by fire, and WFE paid out the insurance claim to the owner of the building.

Later, it was discovered that the owner of the building had deliberately set the fire in order to claim the insurance money. WFE demanded that the owner of the building repay the money, but the owner of the building refused.

WFE applied to the Supreme Court of South Africa (Court) for an order declaring that the owner of the building was not entitled to the insurance money and that WFE was entitled to recover the money from the owner of the building.

Held:

The Court held that WFE could recover the money from the owner of the building. The Court reasoned that the owner of the building had been unjustly enriched by receiving the insurance money and that WFE was entitled to recover the money as a condictio indebiti.

A condictio indebiti is a legal remedy that allows a person to recover money that they have paid to another person by mistake. In this case, WFE had paid the insurance money to the owner of the building by mistake because they were not aware that the owner of the building had deliberately set the fire.

Key Facts:

• An insurance company paid out an insurance claim to the owner of a building that was damaged by fire.
• Later, it was discovered that the owner of the building had deliberately set the fire in order to claim the insurance money.
• The insurance company demanded that the owner of the building repay the money, but the owner of the building refused.
• The insurance company applied to the Supreme Court of South Africa for an order declaring that the owner of the building was not entitled to the insurance money and that the insurance company was entitled to recover the money from the owner of the building.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the insurance company could recover the money from the owner of the building because the owner of the building had been unjustly enriched by receiving the insurance money.
• The Court reasoned that the owner of the building had not been entitled to the insurance money because they had deliberately set the fire.
• The Court also found that the insurance company had paid the insurance money to the owner of the building by mistake.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue 1992 (4) SA 202 (A) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision clarified the law of unjust enrichment and made it clear that a person who has been unjustly enriched by receiving money by mistake is liable to repay the money.

Miller and Others v Bellville Municipality 1971 (4) SA 544 (C)

Miller and Others v Bellville Municipality 1971 (4) SA 544 (C)

Issue: Whether a municipality can expropriate property without following the statutory expropriation process.

Facts:

The Bellville Municipality (Municipality) planned to construct a new road through the properties of several landowners, including the Millers. The Municipality issued notices to the landowners, informing them of the plan and requesting them to vacate their properties.

The Millers objected to the Municipality's actions, arguing that the Municipality could not expropriate their property without following the statutory expropriation process. The statutory expropriation process required the Municipality to obtain authorization from the Administrator of the Cape Province before expropriating property.

The Municipality ignored the Millers' objections and proceeded to demolish their properties and construct the road. The Millers applied to the Supreme Court of South Africa (Court) for an order to interdict the Municipality from proceeding with the road construction and to compel the Municipality to restore their properties to their original state.

Held:

The Court held that the Municipality could not expropriate property without following the statutory expropriation process. The Court reasoned that the statutory expropriation process was designed to protect the rights of property owners and to ensure that expropriation was only carried out in accordance with the law.

The Court also found that the Municipality's actions had been unlawful and that the Municipality had no right to demolish the Millers' properties without first obtaining the necessary authorization. The Court granted an interdict prohibiting the Municipality from continuing with the road construction and ordered the Municipality to restore the Millers' properties to their original state.

Key Facts:

• A municipality planned to construct a new road through the properties of several landowners without following the statutory expropriation process.
• The landowners objected to the municipality's actions, arguing that the municipality could not expropriate their property without following the statutory expropriation process.
• The municipality ignored the landowners' objections and proceeded to demolish their properties and construct the road.
• The landowners applied to the Supreme Court of South Africa for an order to interdict the municipality from proceeding with the road construction and to compel the municipality to restore their properties to their original state.

Reasons:

• The Court held that the municipality could not expropriate property without following the statutory expropriation process because the statutory expropriation process was designed to protect the rights of property owners and to ensure that expropriation was only carried out in accordance with the law.
• The Court also found that the municipality's actions had been unlawful and that the municipality had no right to demolish the landowners' properties without first obtaining the necessary authorization.

Conclusion:

The Court's decision in Miller and Others v Bellville Municipality 1971 (4) SA 544 (C) is a significant case in South African law. The Court's decision reaffirmed the principle that municipalities cannot expropriate property without following the statutory expropriation process and that property owners have the right to challenge unlawful expropriation attempts.